There is a definite ambiguity about whether the Platonic Socrates
can refuse to defend himself against persecution to the best of his ability, or
escape punishment to the best of his ability, without compromising his morals
(as either way he chooses to do neither and remain steadfast in his commitments).
And if there is a way to be morally uncompromising and live, why does Socrates
not do so? Is he ignorant of it? Another possibility is that the death or
noncompliance is itself is an illustrative Socratic choice, as an example of what is right to do in opposition to an unjust society. Or maybe still the uncompromising plainness of Socrates was an artistic addition of Plato, to make his
friend seem a little bit less or a little bit more human than he was at the end.
Friday, January 27, 2017
In Response to Force, Rhetoric, and the Apology (with links)
Original post here
Powerful nuance stems from examining the implicature of
texts, not just their literal content (the moral selection of their timing in context, the things which
they leave out, the ways they direct the reader to be different in order to understand them). Plato’s
Socrates seems to anticipate this turn in modern philosophy at times, when he
chases truth as understood by himself/his audience and not logic alone on its
own structural plane.
In Response to Dissolute Deity (with links)
The two factors that come to mind first for me in this
cognitive dissonance are: Greek endogamy and Greek religion-as-practice. Rather
than an example of double-think,
where the Greek gods can do no wrong despite doing obvious wrong, Greek myth seems exegetically to resemble more
allegory/fable than moral code/scripture. Divinity takes priority as a
discernible trait, and the non-literal social implications of myth have to be teased out with that buffer of divinity-as-different in mind. Zeus operates on a clear double-standard to
heroes (what is acceptable for a god to get away with does not end well for
many mortals). Also, the endogamous Greek families were insular and duty-bound (to the best of my knowledge?).
Much of Euthyphro’s oddity comes from his indictment occurring in the face of a
clear hierarchical divide (the father a citizen and the servant as a servant,
contrasted with the slave finally lowest) and social indifference (why is he,
of all people, the prosecutor?).
Wednesday, January 25, 2017
Little Interests
This week three objects of study have intrigued me outside
of the classroom regarding Ancient Greek culture (excluding assigned texts and
suggestions).
I found archived recordings of Alan Bloom speaking on the Apology. His interpretations are striking in their keenness (always with an
edge), and their starkness (not insight but crisp clarity). Listening to them
while keeping notes (and attempting to hold fast on a different interpretation
of say, Socrates or Philosophical Tension that differs from his) is an experience.
I had been meaning to look into Anna Carson’s treatment of Greek
works for some time, and at a local library came upon If Not, Winter: Fragments of Sappho. It is a bit off-topic, but
the book has quite the strange beauty to it and sets original Greek fragments
next to interpretations/notes if you have the opportunity to check it out.
The Greek Bible, as with many historical/theological texts,
has a motivated following online eager to share its contents. Sifting through
these resources, while bumbling about cyberspace for tidbits on Neoplatonism in
the Bible or Pythagorean scholars of the era, I came across this (abandoned?) guide to “real Greek”. Like all of my links this week, the academic reliability
of it as a source is a bit idiosyncratic (Bloom’s forceful structure, Carson’s
poetry, this having no real accountable authority, etc.). Something to cross-reference, at any least, but interesting.
Saturday, January 21, 2017
Aporia (ἀπορία) and other mysteries
I hope to use this space as a buffer (to catch related passing interests before they dissipate). The internet is a good place for collecting things of oddity or interest and holding them to task. I say "mystery" and "passing interests" here knowing full well that there are others more determined and learned than myself to whom these things will be neither mysterious nor temporary in character.
While down the rabbit hole of researching for my Capstone class (which has been using philosophy as a catch-all term for ideology and focusing on Foucault), I stumbled onto a hole in my knowledge.
On a whim, I had looked up on of the more obscure terms (there were many obscure terms) used by one of the less esoteric post-structural thinkers (Derrida). At this point I am not even sure if its current "aporetic" use was invented by him or just used idiosyncratically by him, as much of post-structural analysis seems to entail highly arcane readings of significant literature. The term was "aporia", or "aporias".
I suppose that this qualifies as several holes in my knowledge. Many of the structural critiques of the post-structural turn still escape me in import (especially in an articulate sense). But more importantly, this was several somethings that I did not know, all of which relied on things I had access to.
Derrida, and some secondary sources commenting on Deleuze, seemed to be using aporia in a manner according to Kant's antimony (sometimes about Kant's antinomies, in ways that would not occur to me as a reader of Kant to do in similar contexts). Dictionary pages cite it back to Greek, as "ἀπορία" originally. Is there a better translation? Finally, it seems to have some relevance to Plato's dialogues in which it appears as a concept. We may be reading some context in the coming weeks.
Rather than relying on the initial impressions I had during preliminary internet research, I am interested in learning (whenever I do) about the truth of the meaning in context. There is definite evidence of a concept evolving over time from cultural or intellectual pressure. As Platonic scholarship goes generally, I hope that the cases which involve charismatic accident come to light.
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